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INTRODUCTION

As Ruthie Stevenson, President of Michigan's Macomb County
chapter of the NAACP, 1 exited her neighborhood post office, an
individual approached her and asked her to sign a petition about
affirmative action that would "'make civil rights fairer for every* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A., Wellesley College; M.Phil., Oxford University; J.D., Harvard University Law School. The
author would like to thank Alaina Beverly and Shanta Anderson-Williams for inspiring this Article.
1. NAACP is an abbreviation for National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.
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body.'" 2 The petition circulator informed her that Ruthie Stevenson supported the infamous petition.3 Ms. Stevenson was taken
aback, knowing that she opposed the petition, which sought to
limit affirmative action policies in Michigan. Ms. Stevenson informed the circulator that she was Ruthie Stevenson and that she
did not support the ban of affirmative action.4 The petitioner
walked away without responding to Ms. Stevenson's request that
they "stop using [her] name to garner signatures." 5
Subsequent testimony before a federal court revealed similar
events occurring throughout Michigan in 2004 and 2005. In Detroit, a few miles south of Macomb County, another circulator approached Lawrence Fears and asked him to sign the same petition.6
Mr. Fears attempted to read the petition but was unable to do so
because, in his words, "the language was.., obscured by padding
and tape attached to the clipboard."' 7 Mr. Fears asked the circulator what the petition concerned. The canvasser responded that she
was collecting signatures to place an initiative "to keep affirmative
action" 8 on the ballot in the November 2006 elections. Mr. Fears
had heard about a ballot initiative that was being circulated to do
away with affirmative action, an effort that Ward Connerly led and
identical to efforts Connerly waged in California 9 and Washington." Mr. Fears asked the circulator if the petition "had anything
to do" with Connerly. 1 1 The circulator told him "that it did not and
that she was 'not trying to do that.'"12 Mr. Fears, still unable to
2. Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61323, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
3. Id.; see also MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT ON THE USE OF FRAUD
AND DECEPTION IN THE GATHERING OF SIGNATURES FOR THE MICHIGAN CIVIL
RIGHTS INITIATIVE 7 (2006), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/PetitionFraudreport_162009_7.pdf [hereinafter MCRC REPORT].
4. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. At the hearing, Ruthie Stevenson also

read an affidavit from another voter who was told by a circulator that Ruthie Stevenson supported the petition. Id.
5. Michigan Civil Rights Commission Detroit Public Hearing, Transcript at 11
(Jan. 11, 2006), available at http://www.chetlyzarko.com/original-content/mcrc-hearing-01112006.html [hereinafter Detroit Transcript]; see also Operation King's Dream,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *18.
6. OperationKing's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *16-17.
7. Id. at *16.
8. Id.
9. See Cal. Sec'y of State, Cal. Proposition 209 (1996), available at http://vote96.
ss.ca.gov/Vote96/htmlI/BP/209text.htm.
10. See Wash. Sec'y of State, Wash. Initiative 200 (1998), availableat http://www.
secstate.wa.gov/elections/1998/i200_text.aspx.
11. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *16.
12. Id.
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decipher the unclear language of the initiative, relied on the circulator's representation of the initiative and offered, with his signa13
ture, what he thought was his support for affirmative action.
Fears later found out, much to his dismay, that he had instead
supporting a ballot initiative to do away
signed Connerly's petition
14
with affirmative action.
During that same time period, roughly one hundred miles away
in Lansing, a company hired by Connerly's campaign to support
the anti-affirmative action proposal, known as the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative ("MCRI"), allegedly instructed Reverend
Nathanial Smith 15 and about thirty-five other individuals to collect
signatures for a "ballot proposal [that] was about keeping and
maintaining civil rights."'16 Rev. Smith testified that petitioners
were collectively instructed to approach registered voters and inform them that the proposal was "pro-civil rights and pro-affirmative action. 1 1 7 Rev. Smith claimed he obtained approximately five
hundred signatures before a voter he approached while circulating
the petition informed him that the actual language of the petition
would do away with all race-based and gender-based affirmative
action policies in Michigan.1 8 Smith was confused by the language
of the petition,' 9 but then "checked into it and realized" its "true
meaning."2 Smith testified at a public hearing run by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission that, upon learning the true implications of the ballot initiative, he was "upset" to be "part of
perpetrating a fraud that was perpetrated on [him] by the management company that hired [him] to get the petitions."2 1 Rev. Smith
13. Id. at *17.
14. Id.
15. Smith was the pastor and founder of the In God We Trust Evangelical Outreach and Deliverance Ministries. Brief for Governor Jennifer M. Granholm as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2-3, Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No.
06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2006).
16. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
17. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *21. The District
Court also found that the signature-gathering company that employed Smith "preferred that Black circulators devote most of their attention to the inner city of Detroit," a strategy that Smith, as an experienced circulator, felt was inefficient, because
he "ordinarily solicited signatures at higher volume locations outside the city of Detroit." Id.
18. Id.; see also Michigan Civil Rights Commission Lansing Public Hearing, Transcript at 43-44 (May 8, 2006) [hereinafter Lansing Transcript] (on file with Fordham
Urban Law Journal).
19. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *21-22.
20. Lansing Transcript, supra note 18, at 44.
21. Id.
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stopped collecting signatures for the initiative and attempted to
spread the word about the "true meaning" of the petition. He felt
"hurt that there were hundreds ... of people that had signed this
petition ... under false pretenses. "22
These stories are a snapshot of the many misrepresentations that
allegedly occurred for several months in 2005, during the time that
Connerly's MCRI campaign worked to collect enough signatures
to place its initiative on the Michigan ballot. The language of the
initiative, verbose and unclear to some, asked voters to amend the
Michigan Constitution to "[b]an public institutions from using affirmative action programs that give preferential treatment to
groups or individuals based on their race, gender, color, ethnicity
or national origin for public employment, education or contracting
purposes. '2 3 A majority of Michigan voters endorsed the proposal
in November 2006.24
The substance of the initiative, its controversial nature, and its
eventual passage are issues separate from the procedures employed to place the initiative on the ballot. It is cause for concern
that any proposed amendment to the state constitution-regardless
of its substance-can be placed on the ballot backed by signatures
of registered voters who were told that the proposal was something
different from what it was.2 5 The allegations of fraud were
presented to the Michigan Supreme Court, the Michigan Attorney
General, and the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. Although the federal court found that widespread fraud
occurred, no government entity intervened either to address the
immediate instances of fraud or to set a precedent that could ensure that future occurrences of such fraud would be impermissible.
These allegations of fraud, and the lack of any legal response, are
even more problematic when considered alongside the fact that a
majority of voters who claimed they were misled about the substance of the proposal were African Americans. This group of vot22. Id.
23. See Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, Official Ballot Language 1, http://www.
michigancivilrights.org/media/Actual %20Ballot %20Language.pdf (last visited Apr.
16, 2007). Wayne State University, the employer of the author, is one of the public
institutions affected by the initiative.
24. America Votes 2006: Key Ballot Measures, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2006/pages/results/ballot.measures (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
25. It is notable that the majority of signatures for the proposal were collected
from Wayne and Washtenaw Counties, two counties that eventually voted against the
proposal. See Ballot Measures, Michigan Proposition 2, County Results, CNN.COm,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/MI/I/01/county.003.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
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ers has historically endured barriers to political participation and is
particularly affected by affirmative action policies.
This Article details and analyzes the allegations of fraud that surrounded the placement of the MCRI on the 2006 Michigan ballot,
with an emphasis on the normative concerns that such a phenomenon engenders. It seeks to place the Michigan events in the
broader legal and historical context of election fraud and ballot initiatives, and discusses why the events surrounding the MCRI signature-gathering process are a serious cause for concern. The Article
ultimately enumerates three specific state proposals, as well as a
federal proposal, for addressing the use of fraud and misrepresentation in gathering signatures to place initiatives to change laws or
amend state constitutions on the ballot.
The first proposal is for state authorities charged with reviewing
petition signatures to allow for an "inference" of fraud that, when
met, triggers a thorough government investigation into whether
registered voters signed a petition based upon a fraudulent misrepresentation.2 6 Such an investigation could be as detailed as directly
contacting every voter who signed the petition to verify their signature, or could simply entail a postcard mailing to all petition signatories, requesting that they return a postcard or contact the
relevant authority to withdraw their name from the petition if they
did not intend to sign a petition supporting the initiative. If significant evidence or patterns of fraud are revealed, funds for such investigations could be covered via fines levied on the offending
campaign, even if revelations of fraud do not invalidate the rejection of the initiative petition because of lack of the signatures
required.
A second proposal, which several states have pursued, involves
prohibiting campaigns from paying petition circulators based upon
the number of signatures they collect. Such a proposal may reduce
some of the incentive for canvassers to misrepresent their petition
in order to garner more signatures, thereby eliminating one of the
primary motivations for circulators to commit fraud. Several federal courts of appeals have found limits on per-signature payments
to be constitutionally permissible when enacted specifically in reac-

26. Acts and misrepresentations that constitute "fraud" in this scenario would ultimately be defined under state law. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
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tion to actual evidence of fraud in the signature-gathering
process.27
A final proposal concerns potential federal causes of action
under the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.28 It concludes that a new federal statutory
protection is necessary to protect voters when states decline to act
in any meaningful way in response to claims of fraud. Currently,
such a protection is nonexistent. Despite recent attempts,29 there is
currently no federal statute that bans such efforts to deceive voters.
This discussion is intended to be merely a starting point for a
broader dialogue that seeks to develop adequate protections for
registered voters who are victimized by this strain of fraud and deception. It is hoped that, in detailing the allegations of such fraud
in Michigan, entities will be encouraged to enact effective safeguards to ensure this deception without a remedy does not occur
again.
I.

THE MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE:

GErFING ON THE BALLOT

Michigan law allows for amendments to the state constitution to
be placed on the ballot for voters to endorse with a majority vote.3 °
Under article XII, section 2 of the Michigan Constitution, any state
citizen may propose a ballot initiative by collecting a sufficient
number of signatures of registered voters in the state in support of
placing the initiative on the ballot. 31 Upon receipt of the signatures, the Secretary of State's office reviews the signatures and the
State Board of Canvassers verifies their "validity and sufficiency,"
making an official declaration as to whether the petitioners gar27. See generally, e.g., Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006); Initiative &
Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2001).
28. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1996).
29. See Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, S. 1975, 109th
Cong. § 2 (2005).
30. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 168.471, 168.474 (2007).
31. The specific number of signatures needed in the 2006 election was 317,757, or
ten percent of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor in 2002. MCRC
REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. Article XII, section 2 of the Michigan Constitution states
that
Amendments may be proposed to this constitution by petition of the registered electors of this state. Every petition shall include the full text of the
proposed amendment, and be signed by registered electors of the state equal
in number to at least 10 percent of the total vote cast for all candidates for
governor at the last preceding general election at which a governor was
elected.
MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
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nered enough verified signatures to place the initiative on the
ballot.32
In June 2003, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the use
of affirmative action policies at the University of Michigan Law
School.33 Not long after the decision, Jennifer Gratz, a plaintiff
in the case, teamed up with Ward Connerly to gather signatures
for a ballot initiative that would amend the Michigan Constitution to ban the use of affirmative action "on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin" in public education,
employment, or contracting.3 4 Gratz and Connerly named
32. MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
33. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 ("On June 27, 2003, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the use of affirmative action by the University of Michigan in Grutter v. Bollinger ....
Shortly thereafter, the MCRI [Michigan Civil Rights Initiative] initiated a ballot petition drive in support of an initiative to nullify this landmark civil rights decision. The
MCRI seeks to amend the Michigan Constitution to prohibit the use of affirmative
action in public employment, public education, and public contracting on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin.").
34. The initiative petition proposed an amendment to article I, section 25 of the
Michigan Constitution that read:
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State
University, and any other public college or university, community college, or
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education or
public contracting.
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or
public contracting.
(3) For the purposes of this section "state" includes, but is not necessarily
limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or
community college, school district, or other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the State of Michigan not included in
sub-section 1.
(4) This section does not prohibit action that must be taken to establish or
maintain eligibility for any federal program, if ineligibility would result in a
loss of federal funds to the state.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide
qualifications based on sex that are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(6) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same,
regardless of the injured party's race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin,
as are otherwise available for violations of Michigan's anti-discrimination
law.
(7) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this section
are found to be in conflict with the United States Constitution or federal
law, the section shall be implemented to the maximum extent that the
United States Constitution and federal law permit. Any provision held invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this section.
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their initiative the "Michigan Civil Rights Initiative," or the
MCRI.3 5
During the summer of 2004, after some signatures had been collected to place the proposal on the ballot, confusion arose in state
courts over whether the language of the petition met the requirements of Michigan election law. 36 Gratz and Connerly opted to
begin collecting signatures anew in 2005, circulating new petitions,
with identical language, with an eye towards placing the ballot proposal on the 2006 ballot. The language and title of the initiative,
and its potential to mislead Michigan voters as to its purpose, led
some voters to later allege in federal court that the petition was
written "deliberately ... in order to facilitate [the] fraud[ulent acts
of the petitioners]. '3 7 These voters claimed that "[u]nless a prospective signer happened to notice a five-word phrase prohibiting
'preferential treatment' buried inside the small print of the 337word amendment-and happened to know that 'preferential treatment' was a conservative codeword for affirmative action-the
voter would have no clue that the petition had anything to do with
'38
[banning] affirmative action.
A.

Signature-Gathering for the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative

Between June and December 2005, hundreds of thousands of
registered voters were approached and asked to sign a petition to
place Gratz and Connerly's MCRI on the ballot in the November
(8) This section applies only to action taken after the effective date of this
section.
(9) This section does not invalidate any court order or consent decree that
is in force as of the effective date of this section.
Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 708 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2005) (citing Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action & Integration, & Fight for
Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 686 N.W.2d
287, 289-90 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)).
35. Connerly's other petitions had identical language and titles. California Proposition 209, for example, was also known as the "California Civil Rights Initiative."
See Cal. Proposition 209, supra note 9.
36. See generally Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action & Integration, 686 N.W.2d
287 (relief in part). In particular, the controversy was over whether the "proposed
language of the petition violated [Michigan Compiled Law Section] 168.482(3), which
requires a petition to state whether it would alter or abrogate an existing provision of
the Constitution and include the text of the constitutional provision that would be
changed or eliminated by the proposal." Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, 708 N.W.2d at
141-42.
37. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, Operation King's Dream v.
Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2006).
38. Id.
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2006 general election.3 9 During that time period, according to the
federal district court, the experiences of Michigan voters discussed
above were but a handful of the fraudulent incidents that occurred
throughout the state.4" A federal court later found the incidents to
be so widespread that it concluded that the MCRI campaign and
their circulators engaged in a pattern of fraud that involved deceiving voters into believing that the petition supported affirmative action when, in reality, it would ban the practice.41
Much of the anecdotes and data regarding the acts of the MCRI
petition circulators emerged from several hearings that the Michigan Civil Rights Commission conducted throughout the state in
2006.42 Over five hundred affidavits were collected during the
hearing process, 4 3 primarily from citizens who were either person-

ally victims of "fraud and deceit"44 or who "offered anecdotal or

39. Michigan state law gives petition circulators 180 days to collect signatures.
COMP. LAWS §§ 168.472a (2007). The petitions were delivered to the Secretary
of State's office for review in January 2005, at the end of that 180-day, or six month,
period. See generally TERRI LYNN LAND, MICHIGAN SECRETARY OF STATE, STAFF
REVIEW OF INITIATIVE PETITION (2005), available at http://www.michigancivilrights.
org/media/SOS-MCRI-Staff-Report7l32005.pdf [hereinafter SOS REVIEW].
40. See generally Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *35 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006); MCRC REPORT, supra note 3.
41. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *33-35.
42. In Detroit, approximately 450 citizens attended the first hearing in January
2006, where twenty-eight citizens testified and over 218 individuals submitted affidavits stating they were "misled or fraudulently induced to sign the ballot petition."
MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. At a second hearing one month later in Flint,
Michigan, over 200 citizens attended to observe the Commission receive 106 affidavits
and testimony from thirty-one citizens "concerned about their experience with MCRI
petition circulators." Id. at 8; see also id. at 9 (noting that at the hearing, "Kathryn
Blake testified about how a black female circulator at the Flint African American
festival tricked a substantial number of African Americans (including Katherine Williams the CEO and curator of the Museum of African Ancestry and Research Center)
to sign the petition, saying it is for affirmative action"). In May 2006, a third hearing
was held in Lansing, Michigan, attended by approximately 125 individuals, at which
one citizen presented thirty-one signed affidavits from voters who learned that they
had signed the MCRI petition after they had been misled about its subject by petition
circulators. Id. at 9-10. The fourth and final hearing was held a few weeks later, on
May 22, 2006, in Grand Rapids. Over 300 people attended. Id. at 10 ("The auditorium held 250 people and the seating was at capacity, including 'standing room only.'
Others not able to get into the 'packed' auditorium were watching on a monitor in the
hallway outside of the auditorium.").
43. Letter from Mark Bernstein & Mohammed Abdrabboh, Michigan Civil Rights
Commission, to the Michigan Supreme Court 1 (June 7, 2006), available at http://www.
michigan.gov/documents/PetitionFraudreport-162009-7.pdf (addressing the "shameful acts of deception and misrepresentation by paid agents of the MCRI") (attaching
the MCRC Report).
44. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 ("These citizens signed the ballot petition
under the belief that they were signing a petition in support of continuing affirmative
MICH.
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observational testimony about friends and/or relatives who signed
the MCRI petition under the belief that they were signing a petition to support affirmative action."45 In Detroit, one circulator informed college student Conuetta Wright that "people were trying
to abolish affirmative action and that he was petitioning to keep
affirmative action on the books." 46 Heidi Osgood witnessed another MCRI circulator inform a woman that the MCRI petition
supported affirmative action.47 The circulator did not respond
when Osgood interrupted and accused the circulator of misleading
the voter. 48 Samantha Canty claimed she was approached at a festival in Detroit and asked to sign the petition to "'keep affirmative
action going.' 1,49 Mark Bryant signed the petition only after the
circulator assured him that it supported affirmative action.50 Another circulator approached Andra Williams outside of a public library in a suburb of Detroit and asked her to sign a petition
supporting affirmative action.5 1 Williams signed the petition in reliance on that misrepresentation and only after the circulator assured her that the petition would not ban the program.52 Judge
Robert Ziolkowski of the Wayne County Circuit Court also was
asked to sign a petition that purportedly supported affirmative action.5 3 After he accused the circulator of misrepresenting the petiaction. This group also includes circulators who voluntarily testified about their role in
these specific deceptive events. Some of these witnesses testified that they were prevented or not given the opportunity to read the petition before signing. Others stated
that they did not take the time to read the petition because they believed the comments made by the circulator. These comments included representations that they
were signing a document to support the minimum wage, a document to support affirmative action and/or a document to protect civil rights.").
45. Id. ("This group also consisted of citizens who were approached by circulators,
but who did not personally sign the petition because they were previously aware of its
true purpose or because they read the petition and understood it to be an anti-affirmative action petition."). See OperationKing's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at
*16-25.
46. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *17 (noting that
petitioner also told Ms. Wright, who was with her son at the time, "that if affirmative
action were abolished, then her son would not be able to attend the University of
Michigan").
47. Id.
48. Id. at *18.
49. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 37, at 6.
50. Detroit Transcript, supra note 5, at 41-42, 45-46.
51. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *24.
52. Id.
53. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 ("[Wayne County Circuit Court] Judge
Ziolkowski stated that he was approached by a circulator to sign a pro-affirmative
action petition while shopping at a pharmacy in Detroit. After signing the petition, he
heard customers talking about the representations made by the circulator. Judge Zi-
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tion, the circulator claimed that the signature collection agency that
employed her instructed her to present the petition as a "pro-af54
firmative action ballot proposal.
More stories of misrepresentation and fraud emerged at Michigan Civil Rights Commission hearings held in Flint, Lansing, and
Grand Rapids. In Flint, registered voters testified that they felt
upset that they were "deliberately lied to" and "duped into signing" the petition." Fred Anthony, an African American registered
voter, testified that when a circulator approached and asked him to
sign a petition supporting affirmative action, he was informed that
"the petition would help kids get into college and keep affirmative
action in place." 56 Anthony signed the petition in reliance on those
statements. 57 Former Flint Mayor Woodrow Stanley claimed he
was approached on three separate occasions and at no point was
told that the petition would get rid of affirmative action.5 8
Stories were no different in Grand Rapids. One registered voter
recalled telling the Grand Rapids Press that she and her neighbors
felt "'[b]amboozled"' and "'hoodwinked"' after being deceived
into signing the petition. 59 Lupe Ramos-Montigny was approached
olkowski confronted the circulator and verified tlat the circulator's representations
were false. The circulator told Judge Ziolkowski that she was instructed to present
the MCRI as a pro-affirmative action ballot proposal."); see also Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 37, at 5 ("As Judge Ziolkowski entered a CVS
store on Jefferson Avenue in Detroit, an MCRI circulator asked him to sign a petition
that she said supported affirmative action. Judge Ziolkowski did so. Inside the store,
however, other patrons told the Judge that the petition actually opposed affirmative
action. Judge Ziolkowski returned to the circulator and demanded that she remove
his signature.").
54. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (The circulator "told the Judge that when
she was hired, the MCRI told her to say that the petition supported affirmative
action.").
55. Id. at 8 ("Ms. Kathleen Butler stated that when she asked the circulator if this
petition was for affirmative action, the circulator answered 'Yes.' She stated, 'I'm
very upset that I was duped into signing this petition. I feel like I was lied to, deliberately lied to. I never, ever would sign a petition like this."').
56. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *24-25.
57. Id. at *25; see also MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9 ("Reverend Willie Hill
stated that he was told by a circulator that the petition was to keep affirmative action.
It was reported that petitioners also told signers that the amendment would help their
children get into college, or that it would help the petitioner go to college.").
58. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 ("As former Flint Mayor Woodrow Stanley
stated, 'I don't remember the exact words, but I know the pitch was not, Do you want
to sign a petition to get rid of affirmative action?"'). Stanley was not the only mayor
who was misinformed when signing the petition. In another part of the state, Mayor
of Kalamazoo Hannah McKinney testified that she signed the petition not knowing
she was supporting an anti-affirmative action proposal. Operation King's Dream,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *24.
59. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 37, at 8.
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at a Martin Luther King Day festival in the city and asked to sign
the petition on the representation that it "'protected"' affirmative
action in Michigan.6" Ramos-Montigny "not only signed it, but
persuaded her friends to sign it based on this misrepresentation."6
On a separate occasion, Allison Krantz was at a street festival
when a circulator approached her and "asked her if she cared
about civil rights."' 62 When Krantz replied in the affirmative, the
circulator asked her to sign a petition to "'end all discrimination.' 63 After recognizing the petition as an initiative to ban affirmative action, Krantz asked the circulator if the petition
concerned affirmative action, to which the circulator replied, "it
had nothing to do with affirmative action."6 4
Similarly, a community organizer from Grand Rapids named Sarah Smith testified in federal court that a circulator approached her
in a shopping center, asking her "if she supported affirmative action. ' 65 When she said that she did, the circulator asked her to
support a petition to keep affirmative action alive by helping to put
the MCRI on the ballot. 66 When Ms. Smith asked to see the back
of the petition to read the text of the initiative, she was shown only
a "script" that the circulator had attached to the back of his
clipboard. 67 The script instructed circulators to ask registered voters: "'Do you believe in affirmative action? If so we need to work
together to save it by putting it on the ballot in November. Please
68
help keep affirmative action alive. We need you to sign now."'
Testimony also emerged in federal litigation that the registered
voters were not the only individuals claiming to have been
"duped"-some circulators that the petition campaign hired to collect signatures also claimed to be just as misinformed or confused
as the voters. In Detroit, the MCRI campaign, through a private
company, hired Joseph Reed to collect signatures for the initiative. 69 Reed "read the petition and believed that it was against affirmative action."' 70 After a supervisor in the petition company
told him the initiative endorsed affirmative action, Reed "told po60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *22-23.
Id. at *23.
Id.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *18-19.
Id. at *19.
Id.
Id. at *23.
Id.
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' 71
tential signers that the petition supported affirmative action."
Reed testified that many voters who "could not read well or were
in a hurry" relied on his statements and signed it based on his representation.7 2 LaVon Marshall, another individual hired to collect
signatures, claimed that she received similar instructions from Jennifer Gratz herself.73 Another paid circulator, Exie Chester, observed her fellow circulators "telling 'everyone that it was a
petition to help blacks get into college."' Chester then adopted
that appeal and received an "'enthusiastic response,"' obtaining a
great deal of signatures from registered voters.7 5
Even Doyle O'Connor, a member of the State Board of Canvassers and one of the state officials charged with reviewing and
certifying the collected signatures, witnessed the ruse "on several
occasions" at a popular outdoor food market in Detroit. 76 According to the federal court opinion, the circulators approached
O'Connor "several times and once asked him to sign a petition to
help Black kids get into college. '7 7 After various discussions, the
circulators told O'Connor they were "getting paid and that they
78
did not care what the petition said, as long as they got paid.

B.

State Review of the Signatures Gathered for the MCRI

On January 6, 2005, Gratz and the MCRI campaign submitted
their petition for the ballot initiative to the Secretary of State.7 9
The Secretary of State's only review of the petition signatures was
based on a random sampling of five hundred of the approximately
508,000 signatures filed.80 Michigan law required at least 317,757
signatures to get the petition on the ballot.8 Reviewing just five
hundred of the over 500,000 signatures submitted, the office's report found that only fifty of the five hundred signatures were invalid because they were from non-registered voters or were otherwise
facially defective.8 2
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78,
79.
80.
81.
82.
or less

Id. at *24.
Id.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 37, at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *20.
Id.
Id.
SOS REVIEW, supra note 39, at 1.
Id.
Id.; Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *7.
The sample would have to reveal that the number of valid signatures was 297
in order to be insufficient. SOS REVIEW, supra note 39, at 2; see also Operation
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Operation King's Dream ("OKD"), a 501(c)(3) organization in
Michigan that collected data about alleged fraud and misrepresentation, reviewed the same random sample of five hundred signatures to determine whether the Secretary of State's analysis was
accurate.8 3 Upon review, OKD submitted a challenge to the State
Board of Canvassers and the Michigan Secretary of State, claiming
that 325 of the signatures in the sample were either facially invalid
or garnered by canvassers misrepresenting the petition.8 4 Volunteers with OKD contacted individuals whose names and signatures
were included in the sample and asked them whether they were led
to believe that the initiative was one in support of affirmative action, rather than one that would ban affirmative action." Those
who agreed that they had signed the petition after it was misrepresented to them signed affidavits to support their individual allegation of fraud. 86 The affidavits included claims that at the time the
voters signed the petition, circulators led them to believe "that the
petition was a civil rights petition for affirmative action" and that
they would not have signed the petition had they been "informed
87
that the petition's purpose was to limit or end affirmative action.
Among the evidence the OKD volunteers collected were eightyone affidavit statements from individuals who claimed, either in
King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *7 ("Under state law, the Secretary of
State was not obligated to go beyond performing these ministerial functions in approving the petition.").
83. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *7.
84. SOS REVIEW, supra note 39, at 2; see Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61323, at *7 (noting that OKD defined misrepresentation as occurring when
"MCRI petition circulators deceived signers by leading them to believe that the initiative was one in support of affirmative action, rather than one that would ban affirmative action"); see also Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 708
N.W.2d 139, 142 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the groups' challenge intended to
reveal that a "significant number of the sampled signatures were procured by MCRI
circulators through fraud").
85. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *22.
86. See id. at *17.
87. See, e.g., MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, GRAND RAPIDS AFFIDAVITS 8 (June
22, 2006), availableat http://www.chetlyzarko.com/MDRC-docs/MDRC GR-Hearing
6-22-2006_Affidavitsl.pdf. The standard declaration stated:
At the time I was asked to sign this petition, the petition circulator lead [sic]
me to believe that the petition was a civil rights petition for affirmative action. I was not informed that the petition's purpose was to limit or end affirmative action, including programs for admitting minority students in
universities and hiring minority applicants for jobs and outreach programs
for education and employment. If I had been informed that this petition
aimed to eliminate those programs-had I not been deceived-I never
would have signed this petition.
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person or via a telephone interview, that the petition had been misrepresented to them when they signed it. 88 OKD also alleged that
an additional 114 signatures were invalid "by 'implication' since
they were solicited by a circulator who allegedly deceived other
voters included in eighty-one affidavits.89
At least 203 signatures of the 500 signature sample would need
to be invalidated in order to meet the numerical threshold required
to render the entire signature collection insufficient. 90 The Secretary of State's office had invalidated fifty signatures in the sample. 91 The OKD challenge would have to deem 153 additional
signatures invalid to require the rejection of the petition under the
Secretary of State's policy. 92 OKD submitted, and the office reviewed, 325 challenges. 93 The Secretary of State accepted only 195
as relevant to the challenge. 94
88. SOS REVIEW, supra note 39, at 2; see also id. at 2-3 ("[Three] signatures challenged on the basis of 'misrepresentation' which are supported by a personalized
statement; 32 signatures challenged on the basis of 'misrepresentation' which are supported by a form statement executed by the signer; 10 signatures challenged on the
basis of 'misrepresentation' which are supported by a statement executed by the circulator; 36 signatures challenged on the basis of 'misrepresentation' which are supported by a statement executed by a person who claims that he or she interviewed the
signer by phone .... ").
89. Id. at 3, 5. The review continued
[A]t least 72 signatures challenged by implication. The signatures challenged
by implication are not supported by a statement executed by either the
signer or the circulator.... [Of those,] 38 signatures collected by circulators
who other signers allege misrepresented the petition; and at least 34 signatures collected by circulators who are alleged to have misrepresented the
petition according to persons who claim to have conducted phone interviews
with other signers who interacted with the circulator.
Id. at 3. Notably, the Secretary's review also indicated that
It merits observation that any determination that signatures challenged by
'implication' are invalid would necessarily be premised on three assumptions
1) that the circulator misrepresented the petition to every signer he or she
encountered[;] 2) that every signer who interacted with the circulator did not
understand the purpose of the petition and[;] 3) that every individual who
signed the petition at the request of the circulator would wish to have their
signature determined invalid.
Id.
90. Id. at 2 (noting that in addition to the fifty invalid signatures already confirmed by the Secretary of State as facially invalid, "[a]t least 153 of the ... challenges
would have to be accepted [as fraudulently gathered] to render the petition
insufficient").
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2. Forty-two of the 325 challenged signatures were already deemed
facially invalid by the Secretary of State's initial rejection of fifty signatures, and
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Reviewing the challenges to those 195 signatures, the Secretary
of State found thirty-five challenges to be based upon a signed affidavit of some sort from a registered voter claiming her otherwise
valid signature was fraudulently garnered.9 5 An additional thirtysix challenges were affidavits from OKD volunteers who interviewed signatories over the phone, alleging those signatories also
claimed that their signatures were fraudulently gathered. 96 Ten signatures were challenged based upon statements from circulators
claiming they themselves used fraud to induce voters to sign,97 and
114 challenged signatures thought to be invalid by implication,
based upon evidence that the circulators who had collected those
signatures had misrepresented the petition to other voters. 98 The
Secretary of State's staff presented this data in a staff report to the
Board of Canvassers for review, but explicitly did not reach a conclusion as to "the legal authority of the Board to consider misrepresentation as a basis for finding petition signatures invalid."99 The
Secretary's staff report also concluded that the petition to place the
MCRI on the ballot was supported by an adequate number of
signatures. 1°°
On July 19, 2005, one week after receiving the staff report from
the Secretary of State, the Board of Canvassers conducted a hearing and invited witnesses from OKD and the MCRI campaign to
eighty-eight other challenges to signatures were rejected because the challenges were
without merit. Id.
95. Id. at 4 (finding three executed by personalized statement and thirty-two executed by form statement).
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. Id. at 5 ("In 114 instances, no statement was executed by the signer or the
circulator. Instead, the signature was challenged because it was collected by a circulator alleged to have deceived other signers included in the sample."). The Secretary of
State review also noted that, with regard to the 114 challenges "by 'implication,"' one
would have to assume
1) that the circulator misrepresented the petition to every signer he or she
encountered[;] 2) that every signer who interacted with the circulator did not
understand the purpose of the petition and[;] 3) that every individual who
signed the petition at the request of the circulator would wish to have their
signature determined invalid.
Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id. at 2; see also Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 708
N.W.2d 139, 142 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) ("On July 13, 2005, the staff review report was
issued, which examined the 500 sampled signatures, and found 450 valid signatures
and 50 invalid signatures . . . . The report further concluded that the petition was
sufficient under the standard procedures traditionally employed to sample
petitions.").
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address the allegations of fraud. 01' While reactions to the presentation were mixed, one member of the Board of Canvassers, whose
experience has led him to believe that "there will always be certain
circulators who are prone to using 'puffery' and exaggeration to
obtain signatures," later testified that he believed there was "a pervasive pattern of deceptive conduct in support of the MCRI petition, as opposed to 'isolated excesses' by individual canvassers. "102
After some legal confusion arose as to whether the Board of
Canvassers had the authority to investigate these claims of fraud
and misrepresentation, State Representative Leon Drolet, a chairman of the MCRI campaign, requested a formal opinion from the
Michigan Attorney General as to whether or not the Board of Canvassers had the authority to investigate claims of fraud relating to
the signature-gathering process. 10 3 The Attorney General responded by issuing an informal letter, which stated that the Board
of Canvassers did not have the statutory authority under Michigan
law to investigate claims of fraud."0 4 Soon after the letter was issued, and at the request of the MCRI campaign, the Michigan
Court of Appeals intervened to formally interpret the relevant portion of Michigan law10 5 and concluded that the Board of Canvassers lacked statutory "authority to investigate and determine
whether the circulators made fraudulent representations. ' 10 6 The
101. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, 708 N.W.2d at 142-43; Operation King's Dream v.
Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29,
2006).
102. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *20-21.
103. Id. at *9.
104. Id. at *10.
105. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, 708 N.W.2d at 144. The court derived information
about the Board's authority and duties from Michigan Compiled Laws Section
168.476(1), which provides, in relevant part:
Upon receiving notification of the filing of the petitions, the board of state
canvassers shall canvass the petitions to ascertain if the petitions have been
signed by the requisite number of qualified and registered electors ....The
board may cause any doubtful signatures to be checked against the registration records by the clerk of any political subdivision in which the petitions
were circulated, to determine the authenticity of the signatures or to verify
the registrations .... MICH. CoMP. LAws § 168.476(1) (2005).
The court continued,
[t]his Court has stated that the board's duty is limited to determining
whether the form of the petition substantially complies with the statutory
requirements and whether there are sufficient signatures to warrant certification of the proposal. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, 708 N.W.2d at 146..
106. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, 708 N.W.2d at 146; see also id. (citing MICH.
CoMp. LAws § 168.476(1)) ("[I]t is clear to us that the Legislature has only conferred
upon the Board [of Canvassers] the authority to canvass the petition 'to ascertain if
the petitions have been signed by the requisite number of qualified and registered
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court then issued an order to the Secretary of State to take all necessary measures to place the initiative on the ballot. 10087 The Michigan Supreme Court declined to review the decision.'
After the Board of Canvassers subsequently approved the signatures without further investigation, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission continued to investigate the allegations of fraudulent
signature gathering. The Commission held four evidentiary hearings throughout the state to collect testimony and other statements
concerning the acts of petition circulators hired by the MCRI campaign and issued a report on its findings in July 2006.109 The Commission's report noted that the evidence of fraud revealed in its
hearings was "just the tip of the iceberg" and warned that there "is
substantial credible testimony that MCRI's efforts to change the
Constitution of the State of Michigan rest on a foundation of fraud
and misrepresentation."' 10 Calling the impact of such efforts "substantial," the Commission warned that the "acts documented in the
report represent a highly coordinated, systematic strategy involving
'
many circulators and most importantly, thousands of voters."111
In addition:
[T]he Commission's report confirmed that the areas in which
signatures were gathered were not selected arbitrarily or haphazardly, but rather in [a] deliberate and calculated manner.
African American circulators, some of whom did not understand the ballot proposal, were sent into these areas and unsuspecting African American voters were lured into signing the
petition.'12
electors.' MCL 168.476(1) clearly indicates that this authority encompasses examining the validity of the signatures and the registration status of each elector whose
signature appears on the petition and investigating any doubtful signatures ....Here,
the challengers and interveners seek an investigation that goes beyond the four corners of the petition itself (i.e., the validity of the signatures or registration status of the
electors) into the circumstances by which the signatures were obtained. Such an investigation is clearly beyond the scope of the board's authority set forth under MCL
168.476(1). Because the Legislature failed to provide the board with authority to investigate and determine whether fraudulent representations were made by the circulators of an initiative petition, we hold that the board has no statutory authority to
conduct such an investigation.").
107. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *11-13.
108. Id. at *14-15.
109. Id.; see generally MCRC REPORT, supra note 3; see also supra notes 42-78 and
accompanying text.
110. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
111. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *15.

112. MCRC

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 4.
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The report found that "the conduct of the circulators was.., a
strategy that targeted African American citizens on a statewide basis," through the campaign's careful selection of "locations where it
would be expected that a large number of supporters of affirmative
action would congregate, such as churches and community gatherings in African American neighborhoods. ' 113 If the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Board of Canvassers were
unable to intervene to halt such acts, the Commission questioned,
to where could "aggrieved citizens turn for relief? 11 4 The last remaining option for intervention was the Federal District Court in
the Eastern District of Michigan.
C.

Federal Court Intervention

Shortly after the release of the Commission's report, OKD and
several Michigan voters who had signed the petition believing that
they had supported a pro-affirmative action initiative filed suit in
federal court under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
which bans any election law or procedure that results in racial discrimination in the electoral process 1 5 The suit alleged that the
MCRI campaign specifically directed circulators to target voters in
areas with large minority populations, thereby engaging in raciallytargeted fraud against African American voters, and that as a reobsult, at least 125,000 of the 508,000 petition signatures 1 were
1 6
tained under false pretenses and should be invalidated.
In August 2006, the federal court heard testimony detailing misrepresentations made by MCRI petition circulators. 7 The court
described the testimony of fraud as "overwhelming" 11 8 and concluded that "the conduct of the circulators went beyond mere
'puffery' and was in fact fraudulent because it objectively misrepresented the purpose of the petition."' 9 The court also found the
113. Id. at 5-6.
114. Letter from Bernstein & Abdrabboh, supra note 43, at 2.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1996); see also Complaint at 9, Operation King's Dream
v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323 (E.D. Mich. June 22, 2006) ("In
obtaining a place on the November 2006 general election ballot by means of systemic,
widespread, and racially-targeted fraud, the defendants Connerly, Gratz and MCRI
have violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 USC 1973.").
116. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *7.
117. Id. at *16.
118. Id. at *33.
119. Id. (noting that the "critical difference between puffing and fraud is that in the
latter situation, the recipient of false information is in a position to reasonably rely on
the assurances of the speaker"); see also id. at *35 (noting that some of the circulators
of petitions "were themselves led to believe that they were circulating a petition sup-
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a leader of the MCRI campaign, to be
testimony of Jennifer Gratz,
"evasive and misleading" 120 and "typical of the MCRI's approach,
which is best characterized by the use of deception and connivance
the issues in the hopes of getting the proposal on the
to confuse
121
ballot."
Concluding that the MCRI campaign "engaged in systematic
voter fraud," the federal district court held that the campaign
deceived voters into believing that the petition supported affirmative action:
The MCRI defendants were aware of and encouraged such deception by disguising their proposal as a ban on "preferences"
and "discrimination," without ever fulfilling their responsibility
to forthrightly clarify what these terms were supposed to mean.
Jennifer Gratz's confusion at the evidentiary hearing as to the
purpose of the MCRI's proposal supports the Court's conclusion that the MCRI deliberately encouraged voter fraud and did
nothing to remedy such fraud once it occurred.' 2 2

The court accepted the proposition that the Voting Rights Act
applied to the initiative petition process, 23 and that the acts of the
petitioners were covered as state action under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 124 The opinion also explicitly admonished the
porting affirmative action. Other circulators obviously knew that the petition opposed affirmative action and deliberately misrepresented the petition's purpose. In
either situation, the signers were in a position to reasonably rely on the circulators'
misrepresentations").
120. See id. at *30-31 ("The Court finds that Gratz's testimony in this Court was
evasive and misleading .... Gratz's testimony in this Court was consistent with the
Commission's conclusion that her assertions have been 'incorrect at best, and intentionally misleading, at worst.'").
121. See id. at *32-33 ("In reviewing Gratz's testimony as a whole, it is difficult to
determine where the line between wilful [sic] ignorance and deliberate deception
could be drawn ....Unfortunately, her lack of clarity and forthrightness seems typical of the MCRI's approach, which is best characterized by the use of deception and
connivance to confuse the issues in the hopes of getting the proposal on the ballot.").
122. Id. at *35.
123. Id. at *44-45; see also id. at *43 ("In light of the section's broad language, the
legislative history, and the broad construction required in light of the statute's remedial purposes, the Court concludes that [Section] 2 applies to the initiative petition
process at issue in this case, which is a 'practice or procedure' imposed or applied by
the state for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).").
124. Id. at *47 ("Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act imposes an obligation upon the
states to ensure that their voting practices and procedures do not result in racial discrimination. The fact that the MCRI is a private organization does not absolve the
state defendants from their responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act. The Court
also finds that the MCRI defendants acted as part of the state's political machinery
for choosing which issues would be placed on the state's general election ballot."); see
generally Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996) (finding that if a
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Michigan state courts, the Board of Canvassers, Secretary of State,
for not taking the "alAttorney General, and Bureau of Elections
125
seriously.
fraud
voter
of
legations
While the court found that the MCRI campaign engaged in
"well-documented acts of [voter] fraud and deception,"' 126 it also
found that the campaign "targeted all Michigan voters for deception without regard to race.112 7 Therefore, in the absence of a
"[federal] anti-voter fraud statute," the court reasoned, the "defendants' conduct, though unprincipled, did not violate the [Voting
Rights] Act.' 1 28 The court explained that the plaintiffs "established voter fraud but have not established the inequality of access
necessary to establish a violation" of the Voting Rights Act, emphasizing that "the MCRI sought to deceive and in fact deceived
both minority and non-minority voters in order to obtain their
129
signatures."
II.

FRAUD IN SIGNATURE-GATHERING:

CAUSE FOR CONCERN?

The accusations of fraud surrounding the signature-gathering

process for the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights Initiative are not a significant departure from other acts of election-related fraud occur-

ring throughout history. Generally speaking, the presence of fraud
in the electoral context is not a new phenomenon, particularly

when race or political partisanship is involved.1 30 Allegations of
private association's decisions affected the choices on the ballot, the Voting Rights
Act prohibited racial discrimination in the conduct of the association).
125. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *5.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *2.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *51-52.
130. See, e.g., Karen Blackistone, Full and Fair Elections: PoliticalParty Representatives and State Law, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 213, 214 (2006) ("As far back as 1890,
public scandals involving election fraud by both Democrats and Republicans
abounded, and the election platforms of all three parties in 1890 included election
reform proposals. Early twentieth century elections in New York and Chicago, for
example, saw thousands of dead or fictitious people vote. In the presidential election
of 1960, the defeated Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, alleged that massive
fraud in Chicago and Texas had secured the victory for John Kennedy."); James A.
Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty
Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Pirr. L. REV. 189, 235-36 (1990) ("[I]n the
November 1982 general election in Chicago, twenty-six people, mostly election officials, were indicted for election fraud. Their crimes included forging signatures on
ballots of voters who failed to vote and marking and casting those ballots; impersonation of voters; false registration of non-residents; rendering improper 'assistance' to
elderly and disabled voters; vote-buying; fraudulent dissemination and voting of absentee ballots; illegal registration of aliens; and the use of armed violence against
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canvassers' use of fraud and misrepresentation in collecting signatures for ballot initiatives have haunted the process for nearly a
century. For example, in 1912, a California state court reviewed
13,000 signatures in support of a ballot proposal and found that
over sixty percent of those gathered were solicited by fraudulent
means. 131 One year later, attempts were made in Oregon to require petitions to be signed in the presence of a county official or
regisclerk, in the hopes of reducing fraud and ensuring that the
1 32
tered voters understood the initiative they were endorsing.
During the early- to mid-twentieth century, various states passed
laws in an effort to curb fraudulent and deceptive behavior,133 with
most seeking to ban the payment of signature gatherers. 3 This
trend was halted in 1988, when the United States Supreme Court in
Meyer v. Grant struck down a Colorado law banning paid signature
gatherers as an unconstitutional abridgement of political speech in
violation of the United States Constitution's First and Fourteenth
Amendments.1 35 More recent federal court decisions have created
exceptions to the Meyer principle, preserving limited bans on the
voters and campaign workers. In one precinct, election officials staged their own
private election by marking a ballot with a straight Democratic ticket and running
that ballot through the tabulating machine over 200 times. The United States Attorney whose jurisdiction included Chicago estimated that ten percent of the entire vote
in the city during the November 1982 election was fraudulent."); see generally Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1978).
131. See Richard J. Ellis, Direct Democracy in Oregon, OREGON'S FUTURE, Fall
2004, at 6, available at http://www.willamette.edu/centers/publicpolicy/projects/
oregonsfuture/PDFvol5no2/direct democracy.pdf.
132. Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process: How Democratic
Is It?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 35, 94 (2003).
133. See id. at 50 ("A bill to ban paid petitioners was introduced in Oregon as early
as 1909. Similar laws were introduced in legislatures across the nation, including
Washington, South Dakota, and Ohio, where such bans were enacted into law between 1913 and 1914. Most states, though, declined to ban paid petitioners, although
spectacular cases of fraud, or concerns about the control of special interests sporadically forced the issue onto the legislative agenda. In California, for instance, bills to
ban paid petitioners were introduced and defeated in 1915, 1917, 1937, 1939, 1953,
1959, 1963, 1965, 1969, 1973, and again in 1987.").
134. P.K. Jameson & Marsha Hosack, Citizens Initiatives in Florida: An Analysis of
Florida's ConstitutionalInitiative Process, Issues, and Alternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 417, 448-49 (1995) (finding that "[m]any supervisors of elections have noted a
correlation between fraudulent signatures and paid signature gathering," and noting
that, in one Florida county "fifty-two percent of the signatures gathered by paid workers on the casino-gambling petitions were invalid" while "only ten percent of the signatures gathered by volunteers for the Save our Sealife petition were invalid").
135. 486 U.S. 414, 421-24 (1988). The Supreme Court was not persuaded by the
argument that the ban reduced fraud because the Justices believed the potential for
such fraud was "remote." Id. at 427.
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payment of petition circulators
when enacted in response to spe13 6
cific incidents of fraud.
A.

Election Fraud in the Initiative Process and Its Threat to
the Health of Our Electoral System

The presence of fraud in the electoral system37 significantly undermines the integrity of the electoral process and calls into question the health and legitimacy of our democracy.1 38 Election
results that do not reflect the genuine will of the entire polity challenge the basic principle that our democratic government derives
136. See, e.g., Ill. ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003)
(holding that the First Amendment "does not shield fraud"); Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614, 617-18 (8th Cir. 2001); Prete v. Bradbury, Civ. No.
03-6357-AA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28738, at *38 (D. Or. Feb. 18, 2004) (upholding a
per-signature ban on petitioners as constitutional based on evidence that per-signature payments contributed significantly to signature fraud in Oregon); LIMIT v.
Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (noting that proof of fraud or
threat to citizens' confidence in government would provide compelling justification
for regulating payment of petition circulators); see also infra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
137. The United States Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") defines fraud in
the electoral context as "fraudulent or deceptive acts committed to influence the act
of voting." U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 11 (2006) [hereinafter EAC REPORT]. The EAC definition of election fraud explicitly encapsulates such acts as using
fraud or misrepresentation to induce individuals to support ballot proposal petitions.
Included in its list of examples of election fraud are "[k]nowingly causing to be mailed
or distributed, or knowingly mailing or distributing, literature that includes false information... ; [s]igning a name other than his/her own to a petition proposing an initiative, referendum, recall, or nomination of a candidate for office . . . : [s]igning a
petition proposing an initiative or referendum when the signer is not a qualified
vote"; paying someone to vote for or against a candidate, challenging a person's right
to vote without probable cause; "[s]oliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept money
or other valuable thing in exchange for signing or refraining from signing a petition
proposing an initiative"; and "[d]istributing or attempting to distribute election material knowing it to be fraudulent." See id. at 13-15.
138. See, e.g., LORI MINNITE & DAVID CALLAHAN, DEMOS, SECURING THE VOTE:
AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTION FRAUD 14 (2003), available at http://www.demos.org/
pubs/EDR-_-Securing-theVote.pdf ("Given that the integrity of this process is central to American democracy, there can be no compromise on the need for fair elections determined without the taint of fraud-whether on the part of voters, political
parties, election administrators, or others."); Rebecca Murray, Voteauction.net: Protected Political Speech or Treason?, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 357, 357 (2005) ("Free and
equal elections are a fundamental foundation of a healthy democracy. When the election system becomes tainted through fraud or undue influence, the other freedoms
enjoyed in a democracy become jeopardized. It is the role of the government to ensure the election process remains free from such corruption in order to maintain the
legitimacy and integrity of the system.").
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its legitimacy from the consent of the people. 13 9 Electoral fraud in

the initiative process is particularly pernicious because it (1) increases the likelihood of tainted or inaccurate electoral outcomes,

(2) raises suspicions among voters as to the legitimacy of the process, and (3) threatens the role of an initiative as a direct expression of the electorate's view on a particular issue or policy. If the
results of an election are inaccurate due to voter deception, the
election will produce a result that fails to reflect the will of the
people. a4 °
An electorate that perceives fraud as an endemic presence in the
electoral system-based on either their own experiences or the
prevalence of allegations elsewhere-is likely to lose faith in the
accuracy of an election's results, regardless of the fraud's actual
effect on the outcome of the election. For example, following allegations of fraud and tainted results in the 2004 presidential election, several polls revealed that portions of the electorate
questioned the legitimacy of the electoral process. 4 ' In one survey

139. Language supporting this ideal is found in both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."); U.S. CONST. pmbl.
("We the people of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America."). See also Gardner, supra note 130, at 222 ("Because
the people alone have the right to appoint agents in a republic, only a government
consisting of individuals to whom the people have consented can be legitimate."); id.
at 192-200 (defending the Lockean theory of democracy that defines the legitimacy of
a democratic government as rooted in the accurate expression of the will of the people, concluding that "the Constitution reflects a theory of popular sovereignty in
which governmental legitimacy is based on the consent of the governed").
140. The problem that occurs when, as a result of fraud, the actual electoral results
differ from the actual will of the voters was articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in 1938. The court observed that "[n]othing is more important in a democracy
than the accurate recording of the untrammeled will of the electorate," and warned
that "[g]rave[ ] danger" is posed to the government when that will is not properly
expressed and "electors are corrupted or are misled" by false campaign speech. State
ex. rel. Hampel v. Mitten, 278 N.W. 431, 435 (Wis. 1938).
141. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 942
(2005) (noting that mere allegations of fraud "adversely affect[ ] Americans' views of
the electoral process," citing an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll conducted after
the 2004 general election that revealed that "more than a quarter of Americans worried that the vote-count for president in 2004 was unfair" and a Rasmussen Report
prior to the same election that "showed 58% of American voters believing there was
,a lot' or 'some' fraud in American elections").
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Americans
following that election, a full two-thirds of African
42
questioned the fairness of the electoral process.
Ballot initiatives occupy a unique, though perhaps misplaced, 43
position as a direct expression of the electorate's view on a particular issue or policy. They create an avenue for citizens to directly
enact laws and amend the constitution on issues that may be politi1 44
cally unpalatable to the elected representative government.
There is, however, considerable debate over whether ballot initiatives are a beneficial tool for good public policy, 145 particularly
where they seek to amend the constitution. 46 And although there
is significant doubt as to whether initiatives adequately reflect the
policy choices of the populace,1 4 7 they are generally viewed as an
142. See id. at 942 (citing a 2004 post-election NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey that revealed nationwide, "just one-third of African-Americans call the [2004]
vote 'accurate and fair"').
143. See, e.g., Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon,
93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1203 (2005) (noting that the "industrialization of the initiative
process" has led to initiative efforts that "are too often exploited by well-financed
corporate media campaigns," involve interest groups seeking to enact "pet laws without meaningful public debate," or "facilitate discrimination against minorities").
144. See generally David B. Magleby, Governing by Initiative: Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV.
13, 13 (1995) ("The initiative and popular referendum permit citizens to set the political agenda by placing statutes and constitutional amendments on the ballot, and by
vetoing actions taken by legislative bodies at the state and local levels. Using the
initiative, voters may write statutes, and in some states constitutional amendments,
which will go to the ballot if sufficient valid petition signatures are gathered."). But
see id. at 46 (suggesting that initiatives "can also be a way around legislative log jams
or inaction because of organized interests" while cautioning that "many initiatives
that are on topics blocked by powerful interests in the legislature run into the same
phalanx of interest groups in the election campaign, and as we have seen, they are
often unsuccessful in enacting legislation via initiative as well").
145. Id. at 46 (noting that the initiative process "is at best a supplement to representative democracy. When it works well it can orient elected officials to the will of
the people and ratify fundamental structural changes. But carried to an extreme it
has negative consequences for the political system and can undermine the very structure it is intended to supplement").
146. Jameson & Hosack, supra note 134, at 442 (providing a critique of the initiative process as it relates to amendments to the state constitution, arguing that if "it is
to work properly, the constitution cannot be altered to the point that government
does not function properly," and concluding that "a primary concern of the constitutional initiative process is that the constitution should contain fundamental principles
of policy and be difficult to amend").
147. See, e.g., id. at 456 ("Direct initiative processes may not provide the degree of
debate and analysis desirable for determining public policy issues. For example, Florida's direct constitutional initiative process requires only that initiative sponsors publish their balloted proposal twice prior to the election in one newspaper of general
circulation in each county .... The electorate may adopt constitutional amendments
without adequate explanation of their impact and thus cause unanticipated
consequences.").
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increasingly utilized mechanism 148 for ensuring that the policy
wishes of the majority of voters in a given jurisdiction are expressed and, where possible, enacted. 49
This unique role and power of the ballot initiative as a direct
voice of the voters amplifies the effects of the presence of fraud or
deception at any part of the process. Importantly, the ballot initiative process is not one of candidates seeking to sway voters with
half-truths about what policies they will pursue if elected or nominated, nor is it one of individuals voting in the name of another
person or otherwise seeking to use deception to elect or defeat a
candidate. 5 It is instead a scenario by which the actual law or
constitution of the state or jurisdiction is directly altered as a result
of the election. 151 If voters are deceived about what policy they are
supporting, rejecting, or petitioning to place on the ballot, or if
they are led to believe that an initiative would bolster a particular
policy when, in actuality, it would eliminate a policy, the result is
that a law may be enacted or the state constitution amended based
upon an illegitimate reflection of the will of the people.
The above concerns regarding the effects of fraud and misrepresentation are no less problematic when they occur in the signaturegathering phase of the initiative process. Some argue that the manner in which an initiative gets on a ballot is less important, and
therefore should be subject to less scrutiny, than the manner in
which voters are asked to endorse or reject an initiative already on
the ballot. 52 This distinction, however, fails to recognize the vital
roles that the signature-gathering process, the petitioners, and the
148. Id. at 441 (noting that initiatives are becoming "a more prevalent method of
determining government policy in the states"); see also Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Ballot Measures Preview 2006 (Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/statevote/
06ballotpreview.htm.
149. There remain some limits to the range of issues that can be enacted via the
initiative process. For one, they typically must not violate the U.S. Constitution, or
any federal statute, and therefore are susceptible to court challenges before or after
enactment, which can be costly. Proposals are also expensive, and it is often necessary that initiative committees raise hundreds of thousands of dollars before their
proposed statutory or constitutional change is considered viable.
150. For other examples of election fraud, see EAC REPORT, supra note 137, at 1315.
151. See supra notes 144, 146.
152. Ellis, supra note 132, at 338-39 (describing the view that "[m]any initiative
proponents insist it does not really matter how an initiative gets on the ballot because
ultimately it is the people who decide") To those proponents, "[w]hat matters is not
so much how a measure came to be on the ballot, but whether voters approve it or
not. No matter how an initiative qualifies, if it passes it has demonstrated that it
represents the will of the people." Id.
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signatories themselves play in the overall use of an initiative to
amend policy or state constitutions.1 5 3 A primary reason for requiring that an initiative or proposal receive a certain number of
signatures before it is placed on the ballot is so that there is some
evidence of strong and significant support for the policy change.1 54
Such evidence may be misleading if several signatures are gathered
from citizens deceived into thinking they are supporting a policy
that the initiative seeks to eliminate. In addition, the ultimate success of the initiative once it reaches the voters often depends on
how the proposal is worded and how the petitioners represent it
during the signature-gathering phase. Petitioners have the unique
power to frame the issue and, at all stages, are able to characterize
it for the voters. 155 As the district court emphasized in Operation
King's Dream, petitioners share that same responsibility in framing
the issue during the signature-gathering phase as the initiative campaign does in the election phase. 56
The importance of the signature-gathering phase was emphasized in the Supreme Court's opinion in Meyer v. Grant,157 when
the Court described the circulation of an initiative petition as in153. For an extensive critique of this presumption, see id. at 36 (arguing that the
process of gathering signatures for an initiative "deserves greater scrutiny by voters,
by the media, and by state elections officials as well as by scholars" and "should be
treated with the same seriousness of purpose and intense publicity that is generally
accorded contested nomination elections").
154. See Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1987). The number of
signatures needed is typically a percentage of the population that voted in a recent
election. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
1 (2006), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/REPORT%202006-3%20Amendments.pdf.
155. Ellis, supra note 132, at 39 (critiquing the argument that the signature-gathering process is irrelevant to the eventual passage of the petition because such an argument "ignores the power bestowed upon the individuals and organizations who frame
the issue"). As an example of this influence and the power of words, Ellis compares
the wording of Ward Connerly's 1996 initiative to end affirmative action in California,
Proposition 209, and a subsequent related effort in Texas. In California, Connerly's
petition was "careful not to mention affirmative action; instead [his] initiative prohibited the state from 'discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any
individual or group' on the basis of race or gender." Id. His reason for doing so, Ellis
contends, was because "[p]olls showed that overwhelming majorities supported this
language, but support plummeted when respondents were asked about outlawing
state affirmative action programs for women and minorities." Id. Concluding that
the petitioners' "decision not to include the words 'affirmative action' was among the
most critical ingredients in the success of Proposition 209," Ellis correspondingly
notes that the "importance of question wording was underlined the following year
when a proposition to 'end the use of affirmative action for women and minorities'
was defeated by voters in Houston, Texas." Id. at 40.
156. See Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61323, at *33-34 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
157. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
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herently involving "both the expression of a desire for political
change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change."' 58
As Justice Stevens wrote in his majority opinion:
[W]hile a petition circulator may not have to persuade potential
signatories that a particular proposal should prevail to capture
their signatures, he or she will at least have to persuade them
that the matter is one deserving of the public scrutiny and debate that would attend its consideration by the whole
electorate.15 9
Though the court in Meyer did not find evidence of fraud in the
signature-gathering process at issue in the case, and characterized
the risk of fraud as "more remote at the petition stage ... than at
the time of balloting, ' 160 Stevens's opinion ultimately equates the
importance of the process of gathering signatures for an initiative
with the action of voters deciding to support or reject the initiative,
holding that both stages entail "interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as 'core po-

litical speech.'

",161

It is also worth adding a dose of context that, where present,
could exacerbate the aforementioned problems. In the context of
signature gathering for a ballot initiative, voters typically rely on
petition circulators as campaign representatives, and expect them
to be truthful about the impact and purpose of the petition. 162 Because of the voters' ultimate reliance on the petitioner for information about the initiative petition she is circulating, the government
bears some responsibility in protecting voters against fraud and deception and in protecting the overall integrity of the electoral process. 16 3 There is an even greater need for government protection
158. Id. at 421.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 427.
161. Id. at 422; see also Ellis, supra note 132, at 75-77 (critiquing the Meyer Court's
reliance on testimony that the signature process involves detailed conversations with
registered voters on the merits of the petition and accusing the Court of "ignoring a
vast body of evidence suggesting that most encounters bear little resemblance to the
one described by [the testimony], particularly when... the circulator is pushing multiple, unrelated petitions at once").
162. Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61323, at *33 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (depicting voters approached to sign initiative petitions as being "in a position to reasonably rely on the assurances of the [petition circulator]").
163. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997) ("States
certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of their
ballots and election processes as means for electing public officials."); see also MCRC
REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 (emphasizing the importance of balancing "the responsi-
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when the fraudulent actions of petition circulators have a disparate
impact on a group of voters that has historically endured barriers
to political participation. 164 Concern should also be heightened
where this group stands to be uniquely impacted by the passage of
the proposal.
For example, African American voters were particularly affected
by the acts of the MCRI campaign in Michigan. Testimony in federal court revealed that a significant portion of the signatures alleged to be collected fraudulently came from predominantly
African American areas. 1 65 In addition, African American citizens,
who also stood to bear a great deal of the impact of the anti-affirmative action proposal, form a group of citizens who have historically and collectively experienced acts of fraud and intimidation in
efforts to block their participation in the electoral process. 6 6 The
aforementioned negative effects of fraud are thus felt even more in
bility of voters to read and understand the content of ballot language when signing a
circulator's petition" with the "responsibility of MCRI and its agents to be truthful").
164. See also Magleby, supra note 144, at 41 (describing efforts to limit the rights of
racial minority groups and cautioning that the "issue of checks and balances on direct
democracy is most relevant when initiatives target racial or other minority groups").
165. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *22; see also Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 37, at 12 ("The statistical sample
...[indicates that] the MCRI obtained 15 percent, or 75,000, of its signatures from
Detroit-which is now over 81 percent black-and another 10 percent or 50,000 of its
signatures from other communities that are from 60 to 99 percent black. The breakdown of those signatures by ZIP code shows that the overwhelming majority came
from neighborhoods where white citizens have not lived for years.").
166. For a history of the attempts to use fraud and intimidation to block or otherwise harm the participation of African American voters, see, for example, Gardner,
supra note 1130, at 234-35 ("There can be no doubt, however, that American, if not
human, ingenuity at perpetrating electoral fraud reached its zenith in the post-Civil
War south where whites stubbornly and persistently resisted attempts to enfranchise
black citizens. The most blatant resistance to black voting was violent: blacks who
attempted to vote were threatened, intimidated, harassed and beaten. The luckier
ones were paid to stay away from the polls. More commonly, though, blacks were
disenfranchised in less obvious or detectable ways. One technique was to cut off
black participation in the political process at its inception by simply making blacks
ineligible to vote, in direct defiance of the fifteenth amendment. Where blacks were
legally eligible to vote, they were frequently refused registration. Election officials
developed a variety of methods to avoid registering blacks, including the discriminatory administration of literacy tests and citizenship tests, and the implementation of
voter identification requirements. Poll taxes also were used to keep blacks away, and
if a black voter was able to pay the poll tax and sought to do so, his offer to pay would
simply be refused. When blacks managed to register to vote, their names were
merely purged from the lists."). See generally Judith Kilpatrick, (Extra)ordinaryMen:
African-American Lawyers and Civil Rights in Arkansas Before 1950, 53 ARK. L. REV.
299 (2000); Xi Wang, The Making of Federal Enforcement Laws, 1870-1872, 70 CHI.KENT. L. REV 1013 (1995); see also generally John Graves, Negro Disfranchisement in
Arkansas, 26 ARK. HIST. Q. 199, 209-10 (1967).
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constituencies under these circumstances, making it more critical
for the government to respond appropriately.

III.

RESPONDING TO SIGNATURE-GATHERING

FRAUD

ON THE STATE LEVEL

Any analysis of the reaction of state actors to the allegations of
fraud and deception surrounding the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative begins with a focus on the role of state courts and officials
charged with the responsibility of responding to such allegations.
States serve as the primary protector for the majority of election
issues. 6 7 Though the additional oversight role of the federal courts
is relevant and vital, 168 the negative effects of fraud in the signature-gathering process may be limited if states are vigilant about
protecting voters, maintain an "elaborate system for weeding out
invalid signatures," and prosecute "petitioners who knowingly pad
' 169
a petition with false signatures.
Any effective institutional response to fraud in the signaturegathering process should include mechanisms that serve to reduce
the harmful taint such acts leave on the electorate and the democratic process.17 0 That is, the state system should be one that is
able to avoid tainted electoral outcomes, alleviate concerns about
voters' disenchantment with the initiative system and the de-legitimization of the democratic process, and ensure that initiatives
continue to serve their role as a valid direct expression of the electorate's view on a particular issue or policy.
The reaction of state entities in Michigan to allegations of fraud
surrounding the 2006 MCRI, however, reveals a system that did
not thoroughly and scrupulously check and weed out invalid signatures. As a result, the actions revealed a system that did little to
assuage voter disenchantment with the initiative process and may
have led to an electoral outcome-in this case an amendment to
the state constitution-with questionable legitimacy.

167. Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1188, 1189 (2006) (describing the
state's unique role in election oversight).
168. See, e.g., id. at 1200 (describing the importance of judicial intervention in the
electoral process, particularly in reviewing partisan-based state administrative decisions, and recommending effective tactics for plaintiffs seeking federal judicial review
of state election processes).
169. See Ellis, supra note 121, at 85.
170. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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Evaluating the Signatures: An Inference of Fraud?

The Secretary of State is the chief elections official in the state of
Michigan, 7 ' and under state law is charged with promulgating
"standards for petition signatures [which] may include
[d]etermining the genuineness of the signature of a circulator or
individual signing a petition. ' 172 The Secretary of State's Election
Bureau receives the petition and signatures, reviews their validity,
and issues a report to the State Board of Canvassers.1 73 The Board
of Canvassers, which is charged with investigating and ultimately
certifying signatures and placing the petition on the ballot, 74 has
the authority to investigate challenged signatures by holding a
hearing upon the filing of any relevant complaint. 75
A threshold question loomed throughout the Michigan process
as to whether the Board of Canvassers was required, or even permitted, to consider allegations of fraud in the signature collection
phase of the initiative process. To that end, the Director of Elections for the Michigan Secretary of State testified in federal court
that "there is no provision of state law addressing statements made
by circulators of initiative petitioners to potential signers," and
stressed that "to [his] knowledge it is not a crime under Michigan
law to misrepresent the purpose of an initiative petition."1 76 When
the Michigan Attorney General was asked to weigh in on the matter, he issued an informal letter stating that the Board of Canvassof
ers was not permitted under state law to investigate allegations
1 77
fraud and deception in the signature collection process.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reinforced the Attorney General's informal statement with an opinion that interpreted a state
statute conferring canvassing authority to the Board of Canvassers
as "limited to determining whether the form of the petition substantially complies with the statutory requirements and whether
171. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.21 (2007) ("The secretary of state shall be the chief
election officer of the state and shall have supervisory control over local election officials in the performance of their duties under the provisions of this act.").
172. Id. § 168.31(2).
173. Id. § 168.471.
174. Id. § 168.477(1) ("The board of state canvassers shall make an official declaration of the sufficiency or insufficiency of a petition under this chapter at least 2
months before the election at which the proposal is to be submitted.").
175. Id. § 168.476(2) ("The board of state canvassers may hold hearings upon any
complaints filed or for any purpose considered necessary by the board to conduct
investigations of the petitions.").
176. See Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61323, at *25-26 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
177. Id. at *10.
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there are sufficient signatures to warrant certification of the proposal." 178 The court reasoned that the challengers alleging fraud
sought an investigation that went beyond a mere examination as to
the facial validity of the signatures and the registration status of the
signatories. Were the Board of Canvassers to examine "the circumstances by which the signatures were obtained," the court concluded, it would be embarking on an investigation that was "clearly

beyond the scope" of its statutory authority. 179 The impact of the
court's decision was amplified when the state Attorney General
chose not to investigate the allegations of fraud surrounding the
MCRI initiative, leaving voters alleging deception without relief or
remedy from the state.'8 0
The solution here is simple and evident. As the Michigan Court
of Appeals seems to suggest,1 81 state legislatures should not only
178. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 708 N.W.2d 139, 144
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005). The Court of Appeals was interpreting Michigan Compiled
Laws Section 168.476, which reads:
(1) Upon receiving notification of the filing of the petitions, the board of
state canvassers shall canvass the petitions to ascertain if the petitions have
been signed by the requisite number of qualified and registered electors ....
If the qualified voter file indicates that, on the date the elector signed the
petition, the elector was not registered to vote, there is a rebuttable presumption that the signature is invalid. If the qualified voter file indicates
that, on the date the elector signed the petition, the elector was not registered to vote in the city or township designated on the petition, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the signature is invalid. The board may cause
any doubtful signatures to be checked against the registration records by the
clerk of any political subdivision in which the petitions were circulated, to
determine the authenticity of the signatures or to verify the registrations ....
(2) The board of state canvassers may hold hearings upon any complaints
filed or for any purpose considered necessary by the board to conduct investigations of the petitions. To conduct a hearing, the board may issue subpoenas and administer oaths.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.476.
179. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, 708 N.W.2d at 146.
180. MCRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-13 (concluding that "[in the absence of
intervention by the Michigan Attorney General or an Order of the Michigan Supreme
Court, victims of voter fraud perpetrated by MCRI and/or agents of MCRI in the
gathering of ballot signatures lack relief or remedy" while emphasizing that the
"Michigan Attorney General enjoys the authority to conduct an investigation into
voter fraud involving MCRI and/or agents of MCRI and should conduct such an investigation to preserve the integrity of Michigan's electoral process"); see also Letter
from Bernstein & Abdrabboh, supra note 43, at 2 ("If the Secretary of State lacks
jurisdiction and the Board of Canvassers has been restricted from exercising authority
by the courts, then where do aggrieved citizens turn for relief?").
181. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, 708 N.W.2d at 146 ("Because the Legislature
failed to provide the Board with authority to investigate and determine whether
fraudulent representations were made by the circulators of an initiative petition, we
hold that the board has no statutory authority to conduct such an investigation.").
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empower, but require, the relevant election authorities in their
state (in Michigan, the Board of Canvassers) to investigate any
substantial and valid voter-initiated allegation of fraud in the signature-gathering process. Such a change not only would bring Michigan in line with other states that permit the investigation of
fraud, 8 2 but also would ensure that relevant state authorities
would be able to fully investigate allegations of fraud in the signature-gathering process.
This change to the state law, however, may not be enough to
fully promote and protect the integrity and legitimacy of the initiative process. This deficiency was epitomized by the MCRI campaign. Although the allegations of fraud surrounding the MCRI
signature gathering process were significant, they were ultimately
deemed numerically insufficient to garner meaningful reaction
from the Secretary of State.
In Spring 2005, the Secretary of State's office received the challenge from Operation King's Dream, 83 alleging that 325 signatures
from the office's sample of 500 (randomly selected to represent the
over 508,000 signatures collected) were invalid.' 84 The Secretary of
State's analysis indicated that at least thirty-five signatures were
challenged based on voters claiming themselves that they signed
the petition believing it was in support of affirmative action,'18 5 with
another thirty-five signatories making identical claims when an
OKD volunteer contacted them over the phone.' 86 The Secretary
was numerically inof State's office concluded that the challenge
187
sufficient to render the petition invalid.
It is important to recognize that this sampling analysis and all of
the subsequent examinations were based on a mathematical extrapolation of only one tenth of one percent of the over 500,000 signatures collected by the MCRI campaign. The challenges were also
collected by a small group of volunteers, who may not even have
had access to the resources necessary to adequately investigate all
of the five hundred signatures in the sample. 8 8 The Secretary of
182. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. IV, § lb.
183. See supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text.
184. See generally SOS REVIEW, supra note 39.
185. Id. at 4.
186. Id. at 5.
187. As observed by Chris Thomas, Director of Elections for the Michigan Secretary of State, who later remarked on the challengers: "They just never made their
case." Dawson Bell, Is Ballot Challenge Doomed to Fail: Hearing on Affirmative Action Is Today, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al.
188. The criticism levied against the Operation King's Dream challenge-that the
volunteers were unable to contact all 500 signatories in the sample-does not take
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State's analysis, however, limited their concerns to the numbers.1 8 9
It is of note that, while the Secretary of State's office was not required by law to go beyond this numerical analysis, the office did
have the statutory authority to do so. 190
Were the Secretary of State to decide to exercise this authority
and more thoroughly investigate the claims of fraud, she could base
her decision to do so on a finding that the allegations of fraud were
enough to create an inference of fraud that would require a thorough and exacting investigation. In other words, if a group of citizens can show, through the use of affidavits or other sufficient
evidence, that a small but significant percentage, perhaps ten percent, of the sample of signatures gathered were obtained by fraudulent means, an inference of fraud would be created that would
trigger a closer investigation into the signatures. Such an inference
was present in the events surrounding the MCRI campaign. The
Secretary of State's 2006 review found that, of the random sample
of five hundred signatures, at least seventy were gathered by potentially fraudulent means.
Once this inference of fraud is triggered, a closer investigation
into allegations of fraud could then be conducted by the relevant
authority-in Michigan, either the office of the Secretary of State
or the Board of Canvassers. It would entail an examination of all
signatures submitted and would require that all signatories be contacted in order to verify that they supported the petition. Such an
examination could be conducted over the telephone, or could be as
simple as sending a postcard to every valid signatory, asking for the
return of the postcard or a phone call to the Secretary of State if
one feels their signature was fraudulently gathered and would like
it removed from the petition. 9 ' If sufficient fraud is found upon
the completed investigation, enough signatures would be invaliinto account the volunteers' reliance on allegations that for some specific canvassers,
all signatures collected by them were invalid because those canvassers had misrepresented the petions (otherwise known as the invalid by implication challenges). See

SOS

REVIEW,

supra note 39, at 3.

189. See Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61323, at *25-26 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006). The Director of Elections for the
Michigan Secretary of State also testified in federal court that his department's review
process "does not require any review of the substantive language of the petition ...
but is limited to such issues as type size, warnings, and layout." Id. at *25.
190. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 168.31 (2007) ("[T]he secretary of state may promulgate
rules establishing uniform standards for state and local nominating, recall, and ballot
question petition signatures.").
191. If available and possible, the office could also conduct such a canvassing using
the internet or email correspondence.
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dated so as to require the Board of Canvassers to reject the entire
petition. If significant fraud is found, even if it invalidates less than
the number of signatures required to invalidate the petition, appropriate fines could be levied against the offending initiative campaign that would cover the costs of the elaborate investigation.
Such a structure would be analogous to attorney's fees that are
often levied on losing parties in lawsuits.
The ultimate result of such a detailed investigative procedure
would ensure that allegations of fraud in the signature-gathering
process are fully examined by relevant state authorities, increasing
the legitimacy and integrity of the initiative system. By ensuring
that initiative petitions accurately reflect the will of a sufficient
number of the electorate, this reform would also promote electoral
outcomes that justify the role of the ballot initiative as a direct expression of the electorate's view. And perhaps most important, the
ultimate result would be a boost in voters' faith in the initiative
system.
B.

Collecting the Signatures: Reducing Fraud by Eliminating
Fee-Per-Signature Policies

Apart from post-fraud remedies, such as criminalizing the act of
fraud, state legislatures have primarily sought to enact legislation
aimed at reducing fraud by eliminating a significant incentive for
petition circulators to commit fraud: money.1 9 2 There is some consensus among scholars, practitioners, and even some courts that the
practice of paying canvassers based on the number of signatures
they collect is directly linked to high levels of fraud in the signature-gathering process.1 93 In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
in Meyer that legislation broadly banning all paid initiative canvassers is an unconstitutional infringement on the First Amendment
rights of individuals seeking to change law via the initiative process,1 94 in part because there was no evidence that the mere action
192. See generally, e.g., Johnson v. Richards, 226 P. 559 (Okla. 1924); W.A. Schnader, Proper Safeguards for the Initiative and Referendum Petition, 10 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 515 (1916).
193. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 131, at 37 ("Gathering signatures has increasingly
become a business ... [in which] the great majority of those people behind petition
tables are not idealistic volunteers but are instead interested mercenaries, bounty
hunters, paid by the signature, and largely indifferent to the substance of the petition.
Many would be as gratified to have you sign a petition that called for a raise in taxes
as they would be to get your signature on a petition seeking a reduction in taxes. And
they would be happier still if you signed both petitions, and perhaps another two or
three or five while you are at it.").
194. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1988).
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of campaigns paying petition circulators was causally linked to
those circulators fraudulently inducing registered voters to sign
their petitions.' 9 5 Recent court decisions in the Second, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits, however, have indicated some limited restrictions on the payment of signature gatherers might survive constitutional scrutiny if the restrictions are specifically tailored to reduce
fraud.'

96

After Meyer, and in reaction to incidents of fraud similar to
those surrounding the MCRI campaign, several states pursued legislation that allowed for the payment of signature gatherers but
prohibited campaigns from paying them based on the number of
signatures they collected. 197 A handful of district courts subsequently struck down many of these laws, arguing that they were
enacted without sufficient evidence of fraud to justify the restriction.' 98 The tide changed, however, in 2001 when the Court of Ap195. Id. at 427-28. The Supreme Court also held in Meyer that a complete ban on
paid circulators restricted the expression of "core political speech" because such a ban
limited the number of people who could convey a political message to only those who
could volunteer. Id. at 422-23.
196. Person v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 467 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2006); Prete v.
Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger,
241 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2001).
197. Hoesly, supra note 143, at 1216-17 (describing Measure 26, the "Initiative Integrity Act," an initiative endorsed by Oregon voters in 2002 that prohibited petitioners from paying signature gatherers based on the number of signatures they
collected); see also id. at 1217 ("Oregon progressives have complained that [Measure
26] will effectively end grassroots efforts by raising the cost of placing initiatives on
the ballot and thus limiting access to direct democracy to corporations and unions.
Further, the secretary of state has interpreted Measure 26 to ban only payment per
signature, but not termination of unproductive signature gatherers, minimum signature requirements, hourly wages or salaries, or productivity bonuses. Thus, Measure
26 may have more bark than bite."); Jameson & Hosack, supra note 134, at 449-50
(suggesting limits on payments for signature gathering).
198. See Idaho Coal. United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1165 (D.
Idaho 2001) (rejecting an Idaho law construed to prohibit the payment of petition
circulators per signature based on a lack of evidence of fraud in the signature-gathering process); On Our Terms '97 PAC v. Sec'y of State of Me., 101 F. Supp. 2d 19, 26
(D. Me. 1999) (rejecting Maine's prohibition on paying petition circulators per signature, finding that the prohibition burdened the signature-gathering process, and noting that the defendants of the law provided no evidence "that fraud is more pervasive
among circulators paid per signature, or even that fraud in general has been a noteworthy problem in the lengthy history of the Maine initiative and referendum process"); Term Limits Leadership Council v. Clark, 984 F. Supp. 470, 471 (S.D. Miss.
1997) (striking down a Mississippi statute that prohibited paying petition circulators
per signature and finding that the "State has failed to present evidence of fraud ... on
account of the per-signature payment of petition circulators"); LIMIT v. Maleng, 874
F. Supp. 1138, 1140 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (rejecting a Washington state ban on paying
circulators on a per signature basis as an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of
speech under the First Amendment and arguing that defendants of the ban did not
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peals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a North Dakota law banning
per-signature payments to canvassers, finding the regulation justified as a basis for reducing fraud in the signature-gathering process. 199 In upholding the ban, the court compared specific, though
not substantial, evidence of fraud that had occurred in a previous
signature campaign, 0 with the complete lack of evidence that
"payment by the hour, rather than [per-signature] would in any
way burden [an initiative campaign's] ability to collect signatures."20 1 The political speech limits that concerned the Supreme
Court in Meyer were thus not as much of a threat in the narrowly
tailored law enacted in North Dakota.
The Jaeger decision provided legal justification for voters in Oregon to pass, via ballot initiative, the Initiative Integrity Act ("IIA")
the following year.20 2 The IIA ended the practice in Oregon of
paying petition circulators based on the number of signatures they
collected and, as the Ninth Circuit later concluded, was sold to votproduce any evidence to show that paying canvassers per-signature encouraged
fraud).
199. See Jaeger,241 F.3d at 617 (noting that unlike the statute at issue in Meyer, the
North Dakota statute "only regulates the way in which circulators may be paid ...
[and] does not involve the complete prohibition of payment that the Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional"); see also Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 462 F. Supp. 2d
827, 836 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (noting that in Jaeger, "North Dakota produced evidence
concerning an incident in 1994 where 17,000 petition signatures were invalidated and
'a subsequent investigation revealed that payment per signature was an issue"').
200. Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 618 ("In 1987, the Legislature passed [the law banning persignature payments to canvassers] in response to problems that occurred with an initiative that had been placed on the ballot in November 1986. State Representative
Linderman stated, in regard to a 1986 signature campaign, that 'students were being
paid 25 cents [per]signature. There were reported irregularities-taking names out
of the phone book, etc.' The limited legislative history available shows that the legislators were aware of, and contemplated, the bill's effect on the circulation of petitions,
but that they were more concerned with the testimony they had heard regarding signature fraud."). The only additional evidence of fraud cited in the opinion is that "in
1994 approximately 17,000 petition signatures were invalidated [and a] subsequent
investigation revealed that payment per signature was an issue" in their invalidation.
Id.
201. Id. ("While it may be argued that such assertions may establish an unacceptable burden on signature-gathering where the state cannot offer any evidence demonstrating the need to prohibit commission payments, when the state introduces
evidence justifying the ban on commission payments as a necessary means to prevent
fraud and abuse (as the state has in this case), initiative sponsors may not rest on bare
assertions alone.").
202. See OR. CONST. art. IV, § lb ("It shall be unlawful to pay or receive money or
other thing of value based on the number of signatures obtained on an initiative or
referendum petition. Nothing herein prohibits payment for signature gathering which
is not based, either directly or indirectly, on the number of signatures obtained."); see
also supra note 200.
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ers as a reform that would specifically reduce "forgery" and
"fraud" in the signature-gathering process. 0 3 In 2005, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the lead of the Eighth Circuit 204 and upheld the ban because, unlike the law at issue in
Meyer, the Oregon law did "not completely prohibit the payment
of initiative petition circulators. ' 20 5 The Ninth Circuit also noted
Oregon's "important regulatory interest in preventing fraud and its
appearances in the electoral processes, ' 20 6 and cited testimony de-

tailing "reports of interviews of various signature gatherers (paid
per signature) who had forged signatures on their petitions; purchased signature sheets filled with signatures ... ; or participated in
'signature parties' in which multiple petition circulators would
gather and sign each others' petitions. ' 20 7 The court concluded
that the state's interest in reducing such incidents of fraud and deception justified any minimal burden on the political speech rights
of the signature gatherers.
One year later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed suit. In Person v. N.Y. State Board of Elections, the court
upheld a New York statute 20 8 that was applied to prohibit the payment of canvassers based solely on the number of signatures they
collected. 20 9 Like the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Second Circuit found the limit on per-signature payments to be a constitutionally permissible method of furthering the "state's
interest in
210
signatures.
of
gathering
the
in
preventing fraud
203. Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing a voter pamphlet in
support of Measure 26 that referred to convictions of paid petition circulators "on a
variety of forgery, fraud, and identity theft counts" and stating that Measure 26
"would combat such fraud ... by removing the 'incentive for fraud out of the system'
by mandating hourly pay rather than per signature"). But see Bill Sizemore, Measure
26: A Costly Failurefor Oregon, THE OREGONIAN, July 25, 2006, at B5 (alleging that
Measure 26 was merely "a ploy by public employee unions to make it more difficult
for conservatives to put measures on the ballot").
204. Prete, 438 F.3d at 970-71 ("Like Jaeger, [the State of Oregon] asserted an important regulatory interest in preventing fraud and forgery in the initiative process...
[and] supported that interest with evidence that signature gatherers paid per signature
actually engage in such fraud and forgery. This court's duty is not to determine
whether the state's chosen method for prevention of fraud is the best imaginable.").
205. Id. at 962.
206. Id. at 969.
207. Id.
208. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-122(1) (McKinney 1998).
209. Person v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 467 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Although [under New York Law] remuneration to canvassers 'may not be contingent on
the number of signatures obtained,' they 'may still be paid on a per diem, weekly or
other time basis.'").
210. Id.
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This recent case law suggests that states may, within the boundaries of the U.S. Constitution, enact legislation that restricts the pay-

ment of canvassers on a per-signature basis as a means of
responding to evidence of fraud in the signature-gathering process.
The incidents in Michigan in 2006 suggest that such evidence is indeed available to support the passage of legislation to ban the payment of petition circulators on a per-signature basis as a means of
reducing fraud.2 1 1 The canvassers in the MCRI campaign were
paid based on the number of signatures they obtained,2 1 2 and a federal district court found that many of the canvassers fraudulently
21 3 Other states encouninduced individuals to sign their petitions.
2 14
tering similar events can follow suit.
It is necessary to emphasize, however, that the allegations of
fraud surrounding the MCRI campaign in 2006 were not based on
the mere false addition of several individuals' names to petitions.
The allegations instead surrounded whether circulators were approaching registered voters in predominantly African American ar211. In 2006, the District Court for the Eastern District of Ohio rejected an Ohio
statute that banned "fee per signature" compensation, finding that the passage of such
legislation was not justified by evidence of fraud. See Citizens for Tax Reform v.
Deters, 462 F. Supp. 2d 827,835-36 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (striking down OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3599.111 on the grounds that the prohibition of payment to petition circulators on a per-signature or per-volume basis was not supported by sufficient evidence
that "the per-signature payment method is such an incentive to fraud that would justify the burden the Statute places on initiative proponents' core political speech
rights"). This decision indicates that it is vital for states passing such legislation, particularly nearby Michigan, to support it with a detailed legislative record offering evidence that the per-signature policies provide incentive for fraudulent behavior.
212. Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61323, at *27 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
213. Id. at *33.
214. See generally COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(3)(b) ("At least 30 days before a ballot issue election, districts shall mail at the least cost, and as a package where districts
with ballot issues overlap, a titled notice or set of notices addressed to "All Registered
Voters" at each address of one or more active registered electors. The districts may
coordinate the mailing required by this paragraph (b) with the distribution of the
ballot information booklet required by section 1 (7.5) of article V of this constitution
in order to save mailing costs. Titles shall have this order of preference: "NOTICE OF
ELECTION TO INCREASE TAXES/TO INCREASE DEBT/ON A CITIZEN PETITION/ON A REFERRED MEASURE. Except for district voter-approved additions, notices shall include ...[tiwo summaries, up to 500 words each, one for and one
against the proposal, of written comments filed with the election officer by 45 days
before the election. No summary shall mention names of persons or private groups,
nor any endorsements of or resolutions against the proposal. Petition representatives
following these rules shall write this summary for their petition. The election officer
shall maintain and accurately summarize all other relevant written comments."); In re
Initiative Petition No. 379, State Question No. 726, No. 102-999, 2006 Okla. LEXIS 95
(Okla. Dec. 12, 2006).
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eas and representing the MCRI petition as supporting affirmative
action, when it actually was a proposal to ban the practice. Though
one could surmise that this strategy was pursued in the hopes of
increasing the number of signatures gathered in a particular area, it
is not clear that the campaign's fee-per-signature payment process

was a significant inducement for the circulators to misrepresent the
petitions. In addition, the federal court found that some of the
MCRI circulators themselves may have falsely believed the petition they were circulating was for an initiative that supported affirmative action. 2 15 This would indicate that signature gatherers
were not necessarily induced to misrepresent the petitions solely in
the hopes of receiving more money as more signatures were collected. Nevertheless, in states such as Michigan that have seen
fraud occur and maintain little to no regulations on the signature
gathering process, eliminating the fee-per-signature practice should
be considered as a significant component of any effort aimed at
reducing fraud and deception in the petition process.
IV.

RESPONDING TO SIGNATURE-GATHERING

FRAUD

ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL

Courts are uniquely positioned to "serve as a 'referee' [in regulating] state political processes. '216 Political scientist Professor
David Magleby refers to the courts as "'traffic cops,' ",217 and even
goes so far as to rely on them as "[t]he only institutional checks on
the excesses" of the ballot initiative process. 218 Although there ex215. See Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *34-35 ("In this
case, some of the circulators of the MCRI petition were themselves led to believe that
they were circulating a petition supporting affirmative action. Other circulators obviously knew that the petition opposed affirmative action and deliberately misrepresented the petition's purpose. In either situation, the signers were in a position to
reasonably rely on the circulators' misrepresentations.").
216. Id. at *3 (noting that the "Court is cognizant of allegations that intervention in
the political processes at issue . . . would be an unwarranted exercise of 'judicial activism,'" but calling such accusations "without merit"); see also James Thomas Tucker,
Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 443 (1999) (arguing that the constitutional Framers expected the federal courts to serve as "referees" to "protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority").
217. Magleby, supra note 143, at 46 (arguing that courts "not only balance competing rights and liberties but are the 'traffic cops' over the procedures and practices of
direct legislation," and emphasizing that "[t]heir vital role and independence must be
understood and reinforced").
218. Id. at 40 ("The proponents of the initiative and popular referendum so distrusted the traditional system of checks and balances that they largely isolated the
initiative and popular referendum process from such restraints.").
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ists a valid federalism debate over the role of federal courts vis-Avis state courts in regulating election law issues, 2 19 there is near
universal acceptance of the view that both the state and the federal

judicial branches play a necessary role in regulating election-related disputes.
In 2006, Michigan citizens victimized by the alleged misrepresentations of the MCRI campaign were unable to find an adequate
remedy from state authorities. It was a failure that the federal district court emphasized when voters subsequently turned to the federal government with their allegations. 220 Lamenting "the
indifference exhibited by the state agencies who could have investigated and addressed MCRI's actions but failed to do so, '"221 the
federal court declared that, "[w]ith the exception of the Michigan
Civil Rights Commission," Michigan "has demonstrated an almost
complete institutional indifference to the credible allegations of
voter fraud" brought before the state courts, Attorney General,
Secretary of State, and the Board of Canvassers.2 22
When state courts and other entities do not intervene to address
election fraud against the voter, what protections are federal courts
able to provide? Not much, according to the federal court in the
Eastern District of Michigan. In presenting their case to the fed219. See, e.g., Michelle L. Robertson, Election Fraud-Winningat All Costs: Election Fraud in the Third Circuit,40 VILL. L. REv. 869, 880 (1995) (describing the fragile
relationship between state and federal courts in evaluating election disputes and the
federal court's power to abstain from some state election disputes). Robertson also
addressed the difficulties inherent in seeking federal jurisdiction over these claims:
Allegations of state election fraud present several difficult issues which a
federal court must overcome to properly decide the case. First, the federal
court must confront the abstention doctrine. This doctrine requires that
federal courts refrain from examining cases that state courts should review.
State and local laws prescribe how to conduct their elections and the procedures for challenging those elections. Accordingly, local and state governments should monitor the potential violations of these laws. Second, if the
federal court hurdles abstention, the court must find a federal cause of action that provides the plaintiff standing. If a federal cause of action exists,
the plaintiff must then prove the election fraud. Finally, if the plaintiff
proves election fraud under a federal cause of action, the federal court must
select an appropriate remedy. Such remedies range from money damages to
a new election.
Id. at 873-74.
220. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *5.
221. Id.
222. Id. (The district court continued: "If the institutions established by the People
of Michigan, including the Michigan Courts, Board of State Canvassers, Secretary of
State, Attorney General, and Bureau of Elections, had taken the allegations of voter
fraud seriously, then it is quite possible that this case would not have come to federal
court.").
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eral district court, plaintiffs alleged that the MCRI campaign had
violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by intentionally misrepresenting the petition to a group of voters who were predominantly
African American.2 2 3 The federal district court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the MCRI campaign had engaged in documented
acts of fraud and deception, 2 24 but concluded that the fraud affected all Michigan voters, regardless of race.22 5
The district court's application of section 2 was, however, potentially flawed and inadequate.2 2 6 The court found that section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act applied to the acts of the petitioners, because the signature-gathering and initiative petition process "is a
'process leading to nomination or election' within the plain lan-

guage of Section 2. 1227 MCRI petition circulators were also covered as state actors, because they "acted as part of the state's
political machinery for choosing which issues would be placed on
the state's general election ballot. ' 228 The district court did not,
however, apply the totality of the circumstances test typically employed to evaluate claims under section 2, which calls on courts to
consider a variety of factors in evaluating whether a neutral election law or procedure violates the provision.229 Ignoring case law
223. Id. at *2.
224. Id. at *5.
225. Id. at *2. See generally supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
226. An appeal to the district court decision is pending in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
227. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *41.
228. Id. at *47 (viewing this analysis as consistent with Morse v. Republican Party
of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996), Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
229. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 20607. The Senate Judiciary Committee lists several factors courts should consider in
evaluating the effect of neutral election laws or procedures, including:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the
extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if
there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6.
whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
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directing it to apply the totality of the circumstances test,2 3 ° the
court instead relied on an opinion from a separate circuit, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In Welch v. McKenzie, the
Fifth Circuit found numerous "irregularities, errors, and fraud in
the distribution and counting of absentee ballots" that "were racially motivated or had the effect of diluting the votes of black voters," 23 1 but concluded there was insufficient evidence that the
violations affected only African American voters.2 32 Because, as in
Welch, white voters were also affected by the potentially illegal
acts, the court in OperationKing's Dream concluded that there was
no section 2 violation.23 3
The district court was correct, however, in emphasizing that the
Voting Rights Act, the most significant piece of federal legislation
protecting the voting rights of U.S. citizens, 234 is "not a general
anti-fraud statute. ' 235 Without evidence that fraudulent acts were
intentionally targeting or had a disparate impact on members of
one racial group, it is difficult to successfully challenge widespread
election fraud or voter deception in federal court with the Voting
Rights Act.2 36
Id. For an application of the totality of circumstances analysis, see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
230. See generally Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2005); Wesley, 791
F.2d 1255.
231. Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir. 1985).
232. Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 219, at 893 (noting that the court in Welch
"found no violation of the Voting Rights Act even though the state favored a white
candidate over a black candidate. The court, focusing on the voters, held that the
plaintiffs did not prove 'racial motivation or state-created impairment of black
votes'").
233. Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61323, at *51 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) ("The Court finds that in this case, as in
Welch, Plaintiffs have established voter fraud but have not established the inequality
of access necessary to establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act.").
234. Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis of State and Federal Remedies for Election Fraud,
Learningfrom Florida'sPresidentialElection Debacle, 63 U. PITr. L. REV. 159, 194-95
(2001) ("Sections 1971 and 1973 are the primary statutes specifically adopted to regulate the election process, a process which has been traditionally left to the states to
administer.").
235. Operation King's Dream, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61323, at *52; see id. at *52-53
("The Act requires a finding of unequal access, which in this case required Plaintiffs to
show that minority voters could not participate in the electoral process on the same
terms and to the same extent as non-minority voters. The evidence in this case shows
that minority and non-minority voters participated in the initiative petition process on
the same terms. The fact that the terms were fraudulent does not establish a Section 2
violation.").
236. See Lee, supra note 234, at 194 (arguing that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
"merely prohibits anyone acting under color of state authority from discriminating
against individuals on the basis of race, color or previous condition of servitude. It
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In the absence of federal legislation providing a cause of action
to directly challenge fraudulent acts in the electoral process, litigants may be able to turn to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for a potential cause
of action. Under the clause, no state may "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."2 37 As such, a
substantive due process claim is available where a state imposes an
unfair burden on a citizen's fundamental right to vote or engage in
the electoral process, or fails to properly protect voters against attempts to limit the power of their vote, which the state arguably
does in failing to provide effective avenues for protecting voters
against incidents of fraud in the signature-gathering process.
Such an argument was explicitly articulated by the Court of Ap23 8
peals for the First Circuit in its 1978 opinion in Griffin v. Burns.
In evaluating claims that the state improperly instructed voters to
cast absentee ballots that the state later invalidated, the court
found the state had violated the voters' due process rights and ordered that the state conduct an entirely new election.2 3 9 The First
Circuit reasoned that when a state fails to adequately protect its
voters, "the election process itself reaches the point of patent and
fundamental unfairness, [and] a violation of the due process clause
may be indicated. '24 0 In Griffin, as in the case of election fraud in
the signature-gathering process, the federal court was "not asked
to count and validate ballots and enter into the details of the administration of the election," but rather was "confronted with an
officially-sponsored election procedure which, in its basic aspect,
does not address fraud . . . [and] is a limited remedy, in that it protects against discrimination in the area of qualifying voters on the basis of race only").
237. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 219, at 888-90
(discussing a potential cause of action under the Due Process Clause for election
fraud).
238. 570 F.2d 1065, 1076 (1st Cir. 1978) ("[W]e do not see how an election conducted under these circumstances can be said to be fair. When a group of voters are
handed ballots by election officials that, unsuspected by all, are invalid, state law may
forbid counting the ballots, but the election itself becomes a flawed process. Given
the closeness of the election here, and the fact that the 'right of suffrage is a fundamental matter,' . . . we are unwilling to reject [plaintiff's] claim merely on the fiction
that the voters had a duty, at their peril, somehow to foresee the ruling of the [State]
Supreme Court invalidating their ballots.").
239. Id. at 1078-80.
240. Id. at 1077 ("Such a situation must go well beyond the ordinary dispute over
the counting and marking of ballots; and the question of the availability of a fully
adequate state corrective process is germane. But there is precedent for federal relief
where broad-gauged unfairness permeates an election, even if derived from apparently neutral action.").
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was flawed. '24 1 Such flaws, the First Circuit held, implicated due
process because in such a circumstance "the entire election process
including ... the state's administrative and judicial corrective pro242
cess fails on its face to afford fundamental fairness.
Neither of these above constitutional claims-of equal protection or due process-should be taken as an indication that further
federal protections are unnecessary. To create a more significant
and consistent federal safeguard, Congress should enact a statute
that, for example, prohibits any individual from knowingly deceiving any other person with regards to their ability to vote or the
implication of their participation in any part of the electoral process.2 43 The additional creation of a private cause of action in such
a provision would ensure that voters unable to find protection from
election fraud via state processes, as occurred in Michigan in 2006,
could seek such protection in federal court. Congressional authority to enact such legislation would be based upon its authority to
regulate the electoral process to further the government interest in
reducing fraud or the appearance of fraud under Article I, Section
4 of the U.S. Constitution.2 4 4
241. Id. at 1078.
242. Id. Additional remedies for either the due process or the equal protection
claim are available under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, which states that no
person "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State" may deprive another citizen of any constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1996). See also Lee, supra note 233, at 197 (describing the application of section
1983 to election violations and cautioning that "Section 1983 does not provide a substantive right. Instead, it provides a vehicle for the enforcement of a constitutional
right, privilege or immunity ....The courts, however, have expressed great reluctance
to intercede in election contests and have done so only in the case of pervasive
fraud").
243. Various attempts to create anti-fraud statutory protections have been made,
but have languished, in the recent past. In 2005, Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) introduced the "Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2005,"
which sought to make it unlawful, among other things, for any individual to "knowingly deceive another person regarding the time, place, or manner" of a federal election, or the "qualifications for or restrictions on voter eligibility for any [federal]
election." The bill was re-introduced in 2006, and again in 2007 to a democraticallycontrolled U.S. Senate. See Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention
Act, S.1975, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
244. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Jonathan E. Davis, Comment, The National Voter
Registration Act of 1993: Debunking States' Rights Resistance and the Pretense of
Voter Fraud, 6 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 117, 123-24 (1997) (describing various
Supreme Court cases that support congressional authority to legislate anti-fraud legislation in the area of election fraud); Lee, supra note 234, at 195 (citing 91 C.J.S.
United States § 46 (2000)) (arguing "there is no question that Congress has authority
to pass legislation to protect elections").
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CONCLUSION

What happened in Michigan in 2006-a high profile and controversial initiative to amend the state constitution earning a spot on
the state ballot despite findings of fraud and misrepresentation-is
a cloud in a larger storm in the world of direct democracy. For one,
just a month after voters in Michigan voted to pass his MCRI and
amend the state constitution to end affirmative action, Ward Connerly announced that his organization had already selected nine
other states as their next potential targets: Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.245 Voters in those states should be alert to the potential that
the campaign will implement tactics similar to those found to have
occurred in Michigan, which could result in an amendment to the
state constitution246that is "stained by well-documented acts of fraud
and deception.
But it also goes without saying that Connerly's MCRI campaign
was not the first, and it will not be the last, to be accused of engaging in fraud and deception to induce unsuspecting registered voters
into endorsing petitions to place their initiatives on the ballot. In
the absence of strong state and federal protections for voters victimized by such acts, these methods may continue unabated, causing further damage to the integrity of the direct democracy process.
If government officials, state election authorities, clerks, courts,
voters, scholars, and other election experts intensify their scrutiny
of the signature-gathering process, actively endorsing procedures
and regulations that protect voters from trickery and fraud, the
trend can be stymied. When that occurs, our country's system of
direct democracy, celebrated through the initiative process, will be
brought closer to the ideal of being both direct and democratic.

245. Peter Schmidt, Ward Connerly Names States that May Be His Next Targets for
Bans on Affirmative-Action Preferences, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://chronicle.com/daily/2006/12/2006121401n.htm ("The nine states where
[Connerly's organization] has set up exploratory committees to look at putting preference bans on the ballot are Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.").
246. Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61323, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).

